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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this paper, we present a simple stock market model (the 
market game) which incorporates, as ab initio dynamics delayed 
majority dynamics, according to which agents (with 
heterogeneous strategies and price expectations) are rewarded if 
their actions at time t are the actions of the majority of agents at 
time t+1.  We observe that for a range of parameter settings, 
minority dynamics are dynamically induced in this game, 
despite the fact that they are not introduced ab initio.  Central to 
the emergence of minority dynamics is the introduction of the 
notion of price expectations for the agents.  This leads to the 
possibility of an agent not participating in the market for some 
time steps.  One consequence of the induced minority dynamics 
is an effective reduction in market volatility. We also discuss the 
phase structure and qualitative behavior of the market game for 
the entire parameter space.  
 
 
 
  
 
  12/19  v.6.4 
 
 2
 
I. Introduction 
 
The behavior of agents seeking wealth or other rewards in the context of social and 
biological systems can be thought of as being composed of two types of paradigmatic 
actions: Innovation and conformity.  In the case of innovation, an agent will take an 
action that distinguishes himself from most other agents, i.e., one that places him in the 
minority.  Actions associated with conformity, on the other hand, are typically actions 
that place an agent in a group with most other agents, and can be thought of as “majority 
seeking”.  Examples of the majority seeking include coalition politics, or generally 
conflicts in which large numbers of agents confer an advantage.  It is better to be a 
Democratic member of congress when the Democrats are the majority.  Other things 
being equal, it is also better to be a member of the larger of two battling armies.  In other 
circumstances, though, it is better to be in the minority.  In some examples of competition 
for limited resources agents that make minority choices will fare better.  For example, if 
there are two suppliers of parts, each with the same inventory, then those consumers that 
patronize the less popular of the suppliers will have a better chance of having their orders 
filled.  Similarly, driving to work along less crowded roads will often lead to shorter 
travel time and less psychological stress.  
 
At first sight, it would appear that markets can also be thought of as embodying minority 
dynamics.  That is, if one invokes a simple relationship between price and supply vs. 
demand, then it would appear that participants in a market also benefit from being in the 
minority.  So, if there are more buyers than sellers, the price is high and the sellers (who 
benefit from a high price and are in the minority) will be rewarded.  On the other hand, if 
there are more sellers than buyers, the price will be low and the buyers who are in the 
minority will benefit.   
 
A closer examination of the dynamics in markets, however, shows that the situation is not 
so simple.  In particular, depending on the way in which price is determined, the 
dynamics of a market may be more properly described as a variation of delayed majority 
dynamics.  That is, generically, an agent will benefit if his action at time t is adopted by a 
majority of agents at a later time.   
 
In this paper we will show that, properly instantiated, models of a certain kind of market, 
which includes delayed majority dynamics can exhibit minority dynamics, even though 
minority behavior is not rewarded per se.  The ingredients necessary for this emergent 
minority dynamics are delayed majority dynamics and a mechanism that allows agents to 
drop out of trading if the commodity’s current price violates the agent’s beliefs about that 
commodity’s underlying value. 
 
The dynamical nature of the real financial markets and its relationship to the minority 
game have been the subject of some investigation over the past few years1,2,3,4. Among 
the early work in this area is an interesting project carried out by Marsili1 that, 
superficially, resembles our work.  There are, however, fundamental differences. We 
think it is worthwhile to dedicate a short discussion at the beginning of section VI to the 
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differences of the two approaches.  The relationship of other work in this area to our 
investigations will be addressed at various, appropriate points in the paper. 
 
In the next section we will first briefly review the simple minority and majority games, 
their definitions and fundamental behaviors.  In section III we briefly discuss some 
mechanisms for price determination in different markets.  This will motivate, in part, our 
introduction in section IV of the delayed majority game.  In this section we will discuss 
the simple delayed majority dynamics and we will show that, in its simplest form its 
behavior is trivial.  In section V we will introduce a mechanism based on prior 
(heterogeneous) beliefs about a commodity’s worth which allows agents not to trade, and 
we will show that that mechanism, combined with the delayed majority dynamics induces 
minority game behavior in the system, even though minority dynamics is not explicitly 
included.  The paper concludes with section VI which contains a summary and discussion 
of our results.  
 
 
II. Review of the Minority and Majority Games 
 
Consider a game played by N (odd) agents.  At each time step of the game, each of the N 
agents joins one of two groups, labeled 0 or 1.  In the case of the minority game5,6,7, each 
agent that is in the minority group at that time step is awarded a point, while each agent 
belonging to the majority group gets nothing.  In the case of the majority game, each 
agent belonging to the majority group gets a point, while each agent belonging to the 
minority group gets nothing.  An agent chooses which group to join at a given time step 
based on the prediction of a strategy.  The strategy uses information from the historical 
record of which group was the minority [resp. majority] group as a function of time.  A 
strategy of memory m is a table of 2 columns and 2m rows.  The left column contains all 
the 2m possible combinations of m 0's and 1's, representing the list of which were the 
minority [resp. majority] groups for the past m time steps, while each entry in the right 
column is a 0 or a 1.  To use this strategy, an agent observes which groups were the 
minority [resp. majority] groups during the immediately preceding m time steps, and 
finds that string of 0's and 1's in the left column of the table.  The corresponding entry in 
the right column contains that strategy's determination of which group (0 or 1) will be the 
next minority [resp. majority] group, and thus which group the agent should join during 
the current time step.   
 
In the simplest versions of the games, and in all of the games discussed in this paper, all 
strategies used by all the agents have the same value of m.  At the beginning of the game 
each agent is randomly assigned s (>1) of the 22m possible strategies, chosen with 
replacement.  For his current play the agent chooses its strategy that would have had the 
best performance over the history of the game up to that time.  In the case of the minority 
game, that strategy will be chosen that has most successfully predicted the minority 
group, while in the majority game, the strategy that has been most successful in 
predicting the majority group will be used.  (Note that formally, this amounts merely to a 
reinterpretation of the nature of the group predicted by the strategy.  However, this 
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change results in markedly different dynamics in the two games.) Ties between strategies 
are decided by a coin toss. 
 
The original version of the minority game was played endogenously—that is the time 
series of minority groups used by the agents to make their choices was the time series of 
the real minority groups generated endogenously by the play of the agents.  Another 
version of the game uses exogenous information.  That is, the information used by the 
agents to make their choices is generated exogenously, so that that particular time series 
does not necessarily reflect the actual outcome of the historical choices made by the 
agents.  However, the rankings of an agent’s strategies and the rewards to the agent are 
based on the actual minority groups.  Although there are important differences, many of 
the most significant features of the endogenous and exogenous minority games are the 
same.  In this paper we will primarily consider exogenous games.  Where there are 
important qualitative differences with endogenous games we will note them.  Finally, in 
all of the games described here each agent will have 2 strategies (s=2).  Larger values of s 
generally change the results quantitatively, but not qualitatively. 
 
The basic result of the standard minority game is shown in Fig. 1.  Let σ be the standard 
deviation of the number of agents in group 1.   Fig. 1 shows σ2/N as a function of z=2m/N 
on a log-log scale for various N and m (with s=2).  We see in this graph the, by now well 
known, phase transition at zc≈1/3 separating two phases with qualitatively different 
behaviors.  Also at zc we note that σ2/N is a minimum signifying that at this value of m 
the typical minority groups are larger than at other values of m.  This means that when 
z=zc the system manifests the greatest degree of emergent coordination, resulting in the 
greatest wealth production, in the sense of generating the most number of points system-
wide.  Many variations of this game have been studied.  The reader is referred to an 
excellent web site8 for a guide to the literature. 
 
The same structure can be used to play a simple majority game.  The only difference with 
the minority game is that the strategies are interpreted to predict the next majority group.  
Agents are awarded a point for being in the majority group, and are awarded nothing if 
they are in the minority group.  Strategies are ranked according to their success in 
predicting the majority groups.  Different variations of the majority games have been 
exhaustively studied9. Here we restate only the major results that are pertinent to our 
present work.  In the endogenous majority game, after a short transient period, the system 
reaches a stationary state in which the majority group is always 0 or always 1.  In this 
case, the input signal is always ‘00…0’ or ‘11…1’.  In the exogenous majority game, 
however, the system reaches different stationary states in which each input signal 
corresponds to a fixed response that is not necessarily all the same. Agents, except those 
who have identical strategies, play with pure strategies, i.e., the strategy that can put the 
agent more frequently in a majority group. In this game, σ2/N is large and decreases with 
z.  (Note, this description assumes that the probability distribution of strings in the 
exogenous majority game is stationary.) Also, there is no phase change as a function of N 
or m in either version of the majority game. 
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Another interesting variation is a version of a mixed minority-majority game. In this 
variation, the system rewards the minority group at some time steps, and rewards the 
majority group at other time steps. Which group to reward is decided in a random 
manner. Let us denote by p the fraction of times that majority group is rewarded. In fig. 
2, we plot σ2/N against z for various p’s between 0 and 1.  We observe that the hallmarks 
of the minority game (an apparent phase change and dip in σ2/N) persist for games with 
small p. This behavior disappears at a p value slightly less than 0.5. For larger values of 
p, the behavior, a smoothly decreasing function of z, is qualitatively similar to that of the 
pure majority game.  The transition from a dip structure to the smoothly decreasing curve 
occurs rapidly as p varies from about 0.4 to 0.5.  This simple description of the behavior 
of the mixed minority/majority game is sufficient for our purposes.  A detailed analysis 
of the mixed game will be presented elsewhere.10  
 
It is worthwhile noting that other forms of mixed minority-majority game have been 
studied.  In other versions of the mixed game11, some of the agents are “minority players” 
(a.k.a. fundamentalists) who are rewarded if they are in the minority group, while other 
players are “majority players” (a.k.a. trend-followers), who are rewarded if they are in the 
majority group.  In these games, the payoff scheme is consistent from timestep to 
timestep, so that minority (majority) players are always rewarded for being in the 
minority (majority).  These schemes may be regarded as “mixed-population” schemes, 
while our mixing method presented is a “temporal-mixing” scheme.  Interestingly, in 
both the mixed-population and temporal-mixing schemes, there is a critical mixing value 
around 0.5.  That is, when the minority players exceed 50% of the population, or when 
the minority group is rewarded more than 50% of the time, the system exhibits the phase 
structure observed in the standard minority games. 
 
III. Markets and Price Determination 
 
Although markets appear to exhibit some dynamics reminiscent of the minority game, the 
minority game itself is inadequate as a market model.   In particular, the simple minority 
game per se does not account properly for the evaluation of portfolio value.  To do that 
we need to introduce explicitly the idea of price and define more carefully the way in 
which price is determined.  Our model of price and valuation follows. 
 
Suppose we have a collection of agents trading some commodity.  Let the commodity 
price at time t be p(t).  Suppose also that, at time t, agent i holds mi(t) monetary units and 
si(t) units of the commodity. Thus the value of the portfolio of agent i at time t is 
)()()()( tptstmtv iii += .  Each trader can buy or sell one share at a time, and the excess 
demand is filled by the so-called market makers. We use a simple algorithm12 to 
determine price movement: 
 
λ/)()(log)1(log tDtptp +=+                                   (1) 
 
where D(t)≡n0(t)-n1(t) is the excess demand at time t.  n0(t) is the number of agents in 
group 0 (the buyers), n1(t) is the number of agents in group 1 (the sellers) at time t,), and 
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λ is the liquidity coefficient which determines the sensitivity of the price movement is to 
excess demand. In most of our games, we choose λ in the range between 50.0 and 200.0. 
The effect of choosing different values of λ will be discussed below.  
 
To compute the changes in vi(t), we need to specify, in addition to the way in which 
prices move, the way in which the market clears.  This will tell us the price that agents 
will need to pay for a unit of the commodity, and will thus relate changes in portfolio 
values to price changes.  We consider here two options.  First, the market can clear at the 
price that was set prior to the trade.  In this case, at time t+1, buyers pay (and sellers 
receive) p(t) for a unit of commodity.  This is an example of a limit order.  On the other 
hand, for purposes of evaluating portfolios the commodity is valued at the current market 
price, i.e. at p(t+1).  Under this scenario, it is easy to see that the net change in the value 
of a buyer's portfolio is (assuming that each agent’s share is s before the trade)  
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and a seller’s portfolio changes in value by 
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If p(t+1)>p(t), the value of a buyer’s portfolio increases, while if p(t+1)<p(t)  the value of 
a seller’s portfolio decreases.  A price increase (decrease) results from a majority of 
buyers (sellers) at time t+1.  Since buyers (sellers) benefit from a price increase 
(decrease) in the sense that the value their portfolios’ increase, the dynamics of this kind 
of idealized market is that associated with a majority game.   
 
The second method of market clearance we consider is that in which buyers pay the 
current market price p(t+1), which is determined by the mechanism of demand-supply 
relationship.  This is the case of a market order. In this case, the net change in portfolio 
value for both sellers and buyers is 
 
 ))()1(()()()1( tptptstvtvv iiii −+⋅=−+≡∆ .                                     (4) 
 
Apparently, the market is neutral. 
 
In this paper, we will focus on the case of the market order.  It is clear that agents’ trading 
histories will affect the value of their portfolios.  For example, consider an agent who 
buys units of the commodity at time t.  Suppose that at time t+1 there are more buyers 
than sellers.  Then, according to (1) the price at time t+1 increases.  Thus, even if the 
agent does not actively trade at time t+1, his portfolio will increase in value.  Because this 
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agent bought units of the commodity at time t, the value of his portfolio at time t+1 will 
increase more than if he had not bought the commodity at time t.  Similarly, if 
p(t+1)<p(t) due to a surfeit of sellers at time t+1, the agent would suffer less loss had he 
sold some units of the commodity at time t.  To summarize this simple analysis, the 
action of an agent at time t will be beneficial to him if that action is taken by the majority 
at time t+1.  Buying (selling) at time t is advantageous over doing nothing or selling 
(buying) if the majority buys (sells) at time t+1.  Thus, the dominant dynamics in this 
kind of market is that of a delayed majority game, in which agents benefit if their actions 
at time t are the majority actions at time t+1.  Note that to a first approximation it does 
not matter whether an agent’s action at time t is in the majority or minority at time t.  All 
that matters is that the agent’s action at time t is echoed by the majority at time t+1.13  
 
This simple analysis indicates that in a neutral market no advantage is conferred on an 
agent’s portfolio by “buying low” or “selling high”.  Portfolio gains can only be realized 
if subsequent market actions move the price in an advantageous direction.  In a simplified 
model of the market, an agent’s actions at time t will yield short term advantages only if 
the market moves the price in an appropriate direction.  In the short term this implies the 
delayed majority dynamics described above.  Of course, in a real market, different agents 
have different time horizons for their investment objectives.  In the simple model we 
consider here, we are tacitly assuming that all agents have an investment horizon of one 
time step.  The complications of heterogeneous investment horizons will be discussed 
elsewhere.  
 
IV. The Delayed Majority Game 
 
These arguments indicate that delayed minority dynamics are important in determining 
the structure of at least a subset of real markets.  To see what their implications are we 
will first study a very simple game, similar to the minority or majority games, but in 
which an agent receives a point (or a strategy improves its ranking) if and only if the 
group which an agent joins at time t (the group a strategy suggests joining at time t) turns 
out to be the majority group at time t+1.  In this market interpretation, group 0 is the 
group of sellers and group 1 is the group of buyers.  If the majority group at time t+1 is 
not the same as the group that the agent joined at time t, that agent does not receive a 
point.  The architecture of the delayed majority game follows the pattern of the original 
minority game.  Strategies are structured in the same way and decisions are based on 
which were the majority groups for the last m time steps.  Note that in this delayed 
majority game there is no notion of price.  That will be included in the somewhat more 
sophisticated market model in the next section. 
 
As stated earlier, in the experiments we discuss below the publicly available information 
that the agents use to make their decisions is exogenous, so that a set of random numbers 
from 1 to 2m are used as input to the strategy tables.  The strategies that have successfully 
predicted the majority group one time step later are rewarded with 1 point, and at any 
moment, an agent uses his strategy that has the highest cumulative score. A coin flip is 
used to break ties when strategies are equally ranked.  
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The delayed majority games, both exogenous and endogenous have a relatively trivial 
structure similar to that of the endogenous majority game.  Because of the way in which 
agents are rewarded, it will be beneficial to the majority of the agents if the majority 
group at time t is same as the majority group at t-1. In these games, therefore, after a 
transient period, most agents will be playing with a pure strategy and the system will 
approach an equilibrium state in which one group is chosen as the majority group most of 
the time.  In a market interpretation, this corresponds to a perpetual buyer’s (or a seller’s) 
market.  If we were to associate a price with the commodity in this interpretation, that 
price would either go to zero or diverge.  (Note that this is different than the trivial 
behavior of the exogenous majority game in which there is not impetus for the majority 
group to be the same group from one time step to the next.) 
 
V. The Market Game 
 
Although delayed majority dynamics is clearly an important feature of a market, it is 
apparently not enough to generate interesting, let alone realistic structure.  In particular, 
the behavior of the price (although it plays no explicit role in the dynamics of the delayed 
majority game) is an indication of pathology. 
 
To rectify this situation, we note that one of the important features of any market is 
heterogeneity of beliefs.  One aspect of this heterogeneity is embodied in the different 
strategies that agents use to make their choices about whether to buy or sell based on 
previous price movements.  In the context of financial markets this can be viewed as 
heterogeneity in technical trading strategies.  However, there is also heterogeneity in 
beliefs about the underlying value of a commodity that can be thought of as heterogeneity 
in fundamentals.  To incorporate this heterogeneity, we let each agent have an innate 
expectation, ei, of the intrinsic value of the commodity.  If the current price is higher than 
an agent’s expectation, and if the strategy that that agent is using suggests a “buy”, then 
that agent will ignore the "buy" signal of its strategy, and will neither buy nor sell in that 
time step.  Likewise, if the current price is lower than that agent’s expectation, he will 
ignore a “sell” signal from the strategy he is playing.  Thus, agents now have three 
possible actions.  Agent i will join group 1 (buy) if his highest ranking strategy so 
indicates, and if p(t)<ei he will join group 0 (to sell) if his highest ranking strategy so 
indicates and if p(t)>ei.  Otherwise he will neither buy nor sell.  This mechanism allows 
the number of agents participating in the market to vary over time.  It also provides a 
natural mechanism for the system to correct run-away prices.  In the simplest version of 
this game, which we shall describe here, the ei’s are random values assigned to the agents 
at the beginning of the game and do not change with time.  The delayed majority game, 
with the addition of intrinsic, heterogeneous price expectations, we call “the market 
game”14. 
 
To simplify our analysis, we choose the values of ei in a way such that log ei is uniformly 
distributed between two values, log eL and log eU. eL and eU are selected such that they 
are symmetric about the initial price, i.e. eU/p(0)= p(0)/eL.  We further define 
“expectation density”, d, by )log/(log LU eeNd −≡ .  This is a measure of how densely 
the agents’ expectations are packed into the price range (eL, eU).  Note that the smaller d, 
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the more relative heterogeneity there is in value expectation.  Put another way, d controls 
the change in the number of agents who may choose not to trade (because of violated 
value expectations) given a certain price fluctuation.  
 
To begin our analysis of the market game, we first consider the behavior of market 
volatility which is defined as σ[log p(t)], the standard deviation of the log of the price. 
Figure 3 shows market volatility as a function of m.  Except for a set of small values of 
market volatility in the low-z region, there is an obvious qualitative similarity between 
this graph and Fig. 1 which shows σ2/N as a function of z for the standard minority game.  
To understand the relation between these figures, it is useful to first discuss some general 
aspects of price and portfolio behavior in the market game. 
 
In the market game we associate a portfolio with each agent and a value to that portfolio.  
Initially we assign each agent an equal amount of cash and holdings.  The value of the 
portfolio of each agent is calculated using the current commodity price.  One interesting 
feature of these games is that the portfolios of agents tend to decrease in value over time.  
This can be attributed to the role of the market makers in these games, who make a profit 
thereby removing value from the system, which results in smaller portfolio values of the 
agents.  Recall that )()()()( tptstmtv iii += , so )()()()( tptstmtv ⋅+= .  When the market 
reaches equilibrium, the time-average of excess demand will be close to 0, so 
asymptotically )(ts  would vary very slowly. Thus the long-term behavior of v(t) 
primarily depends on that of m(t). Consider the change in total cash holdings between 
two consecutive time steps:  
 
)()/)(exp()()1()(1, tptDtDtptDm tt λ−=+⋅−=∆ +                      (5) 
 
Generally speaking, if D(t) is positive, p(t+1) is likely to be high due to a surfeit of 
buyers.  This results in a fairly large negative ∆m.  On the other hand, if D(t) is negative, 
p(t+1) likely to be low, due to a surfeit of sellers, and so ∆m will be positive but small. 
This suggests that the total cash holding of the agents will decrease over time.  This can 
also be understood as the market makers taking advantage of the unbalanced supply and 
demand and exploiting the agents by buying low and selling high.  
 
To prevent the game from halting, we allow the agents to continue to trade with negative 
cash and even negative portfolio values.   Because the market makers remove value from 
the market, all agents will eventually have net negative portfolio values.  (It is also easy 
to see that market makers remove value from the market at a higher rate when the 
volatility is high.)  It may be unrealistic to expect highly indebted traders to continue to 
trade in a market.  However, our purpose here is not to construct a highly realistic model 
of a market, but to exhibit how reasonable market dynamics can induce minority 
dynamics even when they are absent ab initio.  Therefore, we ignore end effects such as 
agent bankruptcy.  
Let us now return to a discussion of Fig. 3 and the relationship between the market game 
and the minority game.  The position of the dip and the coalescence of values for 
different runs for larger values of m suggest a connection of these results with those of 
 10
the original minority game, despite the fact that there is no ab initio minority dynamics in 
the market game.  To better understand the relationship between the market game and the 
minority game, recall that in the market game, agents will not trade if the current price 
relative to their expectations is in conflict with the suggestion of their favored strategy.  
Consequently, an agent’s actual trading behavior is not a direct reflection of the content 
of his favored strategy. It is possible, though, to observe another quantity that directly 
reflects the nature of agents’ favored strategies, namely, the “potential number of buyers” 
Bp(t). This is just the total number of the agents whose favored strategies indicate a “buy” 
(i.e. join group 1) whether or not the agent actually executes a trade. Similarly, we can 
also define the quantities “potential number of sellers” Sp(t) and “potential excess 
demand” Dp(t). The relationship between D(t) and Dp(t) will be discussed in more detail 
below, but first, consider Fig. 4.  This shows the value of N/2σ  of Bp(t) as a function of 
m.  Note the strong similarity between Figs. 3 and 4.  In fact, we observe that within each 
game, there is a strong positive correlation between the standard deviation of Bp(t) and 
market volatility.  (Note also that this same correlation exists for Sp(t) and Dp(t), since 
they share the same standard deviation with Bp(t)).  In addition, Fig. 4, which is just σ2/N 
for the potential membership of group 1, is very similar to Fig. 1.  If we ignore the few 
small values in the low-m region (we shall discuss this below), we have a dip structure 
which is very similar to that in Fig. 1.  Thus, there is an underlying dynamic in the market 
game which is that same as that of the minority game despite the fact that the original 
dynamics is that of a delayed majority game (supplemented by the dynamics of price and 
expectation).  This dynamic is reflected not only in the standard deviation of the potential 
buyers (and sellers), but also, apparently, in the market volatility (Fig. 3).  In this model 
of a market, minority dynamics are an emergent phenomenon. 
 
To understand how minority dynamics are induced in the market game we first need to 
understand the behavior of successive price movements in the market game.  To this end,, 
consider a binary series L which labels price movement.  Let L(t)=1 if the price rises at 
time t (i.e., p(t+1)>p(t)) and let L(t)= -1 if the price falls (p(t+1)<p(t)).  On the rare 
occasion that p(t+1)=p(t), L(t) is randomly chosen to be 1 or -1 with equal probability.  
Define P(k) as an auto-correlation-function-like measurement of L in a game run for T 
time steps:  
∑
−
=
+−
−
≡
kT
t
ktLtL
kT
kP
1
2/))()(1(1)(                                        (6) 
 
If there is no correlation between L(t) and L(t+k) , P(k) is expected to be 0.5. Smaller 
(larger) values indicate that L(t) and L(t+k) are more likely to be the same (different). Of 
particular interest is the value of P(1), which deals with the relationship of price 
movements in consecutive time steps.  We will show below that the value of P(1) is 
directly related to the extent to which minority dynamics is present in the market game.  
We note, first of all, that in the market game, P(1)’s tend to be greater than 0.5, so that 
there is a tendency for price movements at adjacent time steps to be different. This can be 
qualitatively understood as follows: Suppose, for example, that p(t+1)>p(t).  Consider the 
group of agents that have price expectation values between p(t) and p(t+1).  Call this 
group, group A.  At time t, these agents will not sell even if their strategies say “sell”, and 
at time t+1, they will not buy.  Denote the group of buyers at time t by B(t) and the group 
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of sellers by S(t). On average, about half of the members of group A belong to B(t) and 
the other half belong to Sp(t) (i.e. their favored strategy indicates a “sell”, but there price 
expectation indicates that the current price is too low).  The selling and buying 
populations outside A should remain approximately remain the same size from time t to 
t+1, since the relative size of their price expectations compared the actual price does not 
change from t to t+1.  Therefore, 2/)()1( AtBtB −≈+  and 2/)()1( AtStS +≈+  (|X| 
denotes the size of group X). As a result, AtDtStBtD −≈+−+=+ )()1()1()1( . So, if 
D(t) is not too large, the price movement at time t+1 is more likely to be negative (due to 
a surfeit of sellers), opposite to that of time t. A similar argument applies if p(t+1)<p(t), 
and so P(1) will generally be greater than 0.5 in the market game.   
 
Using now the definition of the expectation density, d (and recalling that we assume that 
the agents are uniformly distributed in log of price expectation) we have: 
dtptpA ⋅−+≈ ))(log()1((log( , and so 
 
 
                                  
                              (7) 
 
 
Returning now to P(1), we note from (6) that P(1) is determined by the time series of the 
sign of D(t).  Although, in principle, this complete time series is necessary to exactly 
determine P(1), we have found that the most important dependence of P(1) is on d/λ.   In 
fact, our results are consistent with a scaling behavior for P(1), in which there is no 
residual dependence on d (or N) separately once d/λ is specified.   (In addition, as we 
shall show below, this same scaling curve obtains for all values of m greater than a 
critical value.)  In fig. 5 we plot P(1) as a function of d/λ for m=8 and for a range of 
different values of N and λ.   P(1)’s of various λ and d lie in the same curve (an estimated 
expression for the linear portion is 5.0/25.0)1( += λdP ).  For any positive value of d/λ, 
there is a negative correlation between L(t) and L(t+1) (P(1) >0.5). For d/λ greater than 2, 
the negative correlation becomes complete and P(1) saturates at 1. Note that this is 
consistent with the approximation, (7), which, for d/λ=1 implies that )()1( tDtD −=+ .   
 
With this background we can understand how minority dynamics are induced in the 
market game. By construction, delayed majority dynamics rewards strategies that 
instructed (or would have instructed) an action at time t which turns out to be the majority 
action at time t+1.  But we have seen that in the market game there is a strong anti-
correlation between consecutive price movements, (as indicated by the fact that P(1)>0.5) 
which means that a majority action at time t+1 is a minority action at time t.  So, for 
example, in the case discussed above, the majority action at time t+1 is most likely to be 
“sell”.  Therefore, a strategy that said “sell” at time t will be rewarded. But since 
p(t+1)>p(t),  selling is the minority action at time t.    
 
)/1)((
)/())(log)1((log)(
))(log)1((log)()1(
λ
λλ
dtD
dtptptD
dtptptDtD
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This argument captures the essence of the dynamics that induces minority behavior.  
However, it is incomplete.  In the argument of the last paragraph, the minority groups 
refer to the groups of actual-buyers and actual-sellers that are smaller.  We can also ask 
whether the induced minority dynamics applies to the groups of potential-buyers and 
potential-sellers. It is true that an analysis that focuses on the groups of potential buyers 
and sellers is further removed from the actual outcome of the market game in terms of 
wealth accrual than is the analysis that emphasizes the groups of actual buyers and 
sellers.  However, analyzing the game with respect to the groups of potential buyers and 
sellers focuses our attention on the underlying dynamics of strategy choice of the agents, 
which is at the heart of the fundamental dynamics of the minority game, and is therefore 
a worthwhile enterprise. 
 
In fact, to really understand whether there are underlying minority dynamics, we will 
need to study cross-correlation functions, that relates the sign of D(t) with the sign of 
Dp(t).  The reason is that it is the sets of potential buyers and sellers that carry the 
information about minority dynamics (which reflects which of an agent’s strategies are 
dominant), but it is outcome of the actual trades that determine the rewards to those 
strategies, and that is determined by the sets of real buyers and sellers.   
 
To that end, let G(t) be the sign of Dp(t), which carries the information of which was the 
minority group between potential buyers and sellers at time t. I.e. G(t)=1 if Bp(t)>Sp(t) 
and G(t)=-1 otherwise.  For the emergent dynamics to be that of a minority game, we 
require that the minority group of potentials at time t-1 is the same as the majority group 
of actuals at time t.  A measure of how often this happens is the cross-correlation 
function ρ1 defined as:  
2/))()1(1(
1
1
2
1 tLtGT
T
t
∑
=
−−
−
=ρ                                         (8) 
 
Of course, a measure of the extent to which the game is a majority game in terms of the 
underlying potential buyers and sellers is just 1-ρ1. 
 
Another quantity of interest measures the extent to which the underlying groups of 
potential buyers and sellers plays a delayed-majority game.  (This is not to be confused 
with the ab initio delayed-majority game which defines our market system.)  The way in 
which our market game is constructed dictates that strategies that predict, at time t-1, the 
actual majority group at time t will gain a point.  But we want to know the extent to 
which the market game instantiates dynamics of a delayed-majority game only with 
repect to the groups of potential buyers and sellers.  Therefore, we need to know what the 
correlation is between the actual and potential majority groups at time t.  If that 
correlation is complete, then the market game is also a delay-majority game in terms of 
the potential buyers and sellers.   We thus define ρ2 as  
 
∑
=
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t
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the larger ρ2 the more likely it is that the majority group of actuals (buyers or sellers) will 
be the same as the majority group of potentials (buyers or sellers) at any given time, and 
so the more likely it will be that the emergent dynamics will be that of a delayed-majority 
game among the groups of potential buyers and sellers. 
 
We want to describe the ways in which the ρI’s vary among games with different 
parameter settings.  We will argue that, like P(1) the ρI’s largely scale among different 
games with d/l.  To do that, we first discuss the relationship between D(t) and Dp(t). We 
make the reasonable assumption that in any range of log(price) potential buyers and 
potential sellers are both uniformly distributed, and the probability of a given agent being 
a potential buyer or a potential seller is 0.5.  With this assumption, a brief calculation 
show that  
 
dtpptDtD p ))(log(log)(2
1)( −+=                                        (10) 
 
where 2/)log(loglog LU eep −= .  If we replace t with t+1, take the difference between 
the two equations, and, using (1), we have 
 
λ/)(2/))()1((
))(log)1((log2/))()1(()()1(
dtDtDtD
dtptptDtDtDtD
pp
pp
−−+
=−+−−+=−+
     
so 
2/))()1(()/1)(()1( tDtDdtDtD pp −+=−−+ λ                        (11) 
Note that if we assume that Dp(t) is time independent, we recover the approximation (7).  
We have seen that P(1) is a function only of d/λ (Fig. 5).  From (11), it appears that the 
only other variable that is involved in the relation between D(t) and Dp(t) is d/λ.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that functions that correlate the signs of D(t) with 
Dp(t) (i.e., the ρi’s will be a function only of  d/λ.  
 
Fig. 6 shows ρ1 and ρ2 as a function of d/λ for m=8 and different values of N. (The 
behavior for smaller m will be discussed below.)  P(1) is also plotted for purposes of 
comparison.  From this figure we can deduce the extent to which minority dynamics and 
delayed majority dynamics among groups of potential buyers and sellers emerges in 
different games.  There are 3 regions in this graph: for 0<d/λ<1, ρ2 is larger than ρ1. For 
1<d/λ<2, ρ1 is larger than ρ2.  When 2<d/λ, both ρ2 and ρ1 are near 0.5.  When d/λ<2, 
delayed majority dynamics among the potentials is always present since ρ2 >0.5.  When 
d/λ>2, there is neither delayed majority dynamics nor minority dynamics.  Recall 
equation (7), D(t+1)=D(t)(1- d/λ).  When d/λ>2, not only will D(t+1) has different sign 
with D(t), its magnitude is also greater than that of D(t).  This implies an amplification of 
the magnitude of D(t) as a function of time.  |D(t)| will until it reaches a limit set by the 
number of traders.  In principle, the natural limit of D(t) is N, the total number of the 
traders.  In fact, though, the maximum D(t) is usually about N/2 due to the nearly equal 
number of potential sellers and buyers, and this limit occurs when price is greater than eU 
or less than eL.  Due to the alternating signs of D(t) (and its large magnitude), the price 
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alternates between very high and very low values.  As a result, P(1) is always 1, and ρ1 
and ρ2 are always close to 0.5 because the potential minority groups have no correlation 
with the actual minority groups, which are now just switching back and forth between 
buyers and sellers.   
 
When ρ1>0.5 the market game manifests underlying minority dynamics among the 
groups of potential buyers and sellers.  This occurs for all values of d/λ<2, but 
interestingly, the extent to which there is such minority dynamics peaks when d/λ is near 
1.3.  To understand this, note that the criteria for the presence of minority dynamics is 
that the strategy that would have put an agent in a minority group is being rewarded.  In 
the market game, the strategy that predicts the actual majority action at the next time step 
is rewarded.  Therefore, for the minority dynamics to exist for the underlying potential 
groups, the actual majority group at time t must be the same as the potential minority 
group at time t-1.  For this to happen, it must be that either 1) the actual majority group at 
time t-1 is opposite to the actual majority group at time t, and the actual majority group at 
time t-1 is the same as the potential majority group at time t-1, or, 2) the actual majority 
group at time t-1 is the same as the actual majority group at time t, and the actual 
majority group at time t-1 is opposite to the potential majority group at time t-1. This 
implies a relationship between P(1), ρ1 and ρ2.  Recall that P(1) is the probability that the 
actual majority group at time t-1 is the opposite to the actual majority group at time t, and 
ρ2 is the probability that actual majority group at time t is the same as the potential 
majority group at time t.  When d/λ is small, P(1) is near 0.5 and ρ2 is close to 1. Thus, 
although the potential groups and the actual groups are almost always the same at a given 
time, there is a probability of about 0.5 that the actual majority group at time t-1 is 
opposite to the actual majority group at time t.  As a result, condition 2) will never be 
satisfied and condition 1) will be satisfied about 50% of the time.  Therefore, minority 
dynamics will not dominant when d/λ is very small.  A similar argument obtains in the 
case in which d/λ is greater than 2.  Here P(1) is about 1 and ρ2 is close to 0.5, so it is 
easy to see that condition 1) will never be satisfied, and condition 2) will be satisfied 
about 50% of the time.  It is only when d/λ is of moderate value and both P(1) and ρ2 are 
greater than 0.5, that minority dynamics among the groups of potentials can be dominant 
(ρ1>0.5).   
 
Although the actual dynamics is more complex, a simple qualitative explanation of the 
shape of the ρ1 curve can be obtained if we assume independence between P(1) and ρ2.  
Under this assumption, it is easy to show that  
 
)1))(1(1()1( 221 ρρρ −−+≈ PP     (12) 
 
The curve (12), using the empirically determined values of P(1)’s and ρ2‘s, is plotted as 
the dotted line in fig.6.  This curve has the correct shape of the empirical curve for ρ1, 
and  peaks at the correct value of d/λ=1.3, where P(1)= ρ2.   
 
The difference between the approximation (12) and the empirical values of ρ1 is that the 
empirical results are consistently larger than those indicated by (12).  This difference is 
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consistent with a positive correlation between P(1) and ρ2.  That is, whenever the actual 
majority group at t-1 is the same as the potential majority group at time t-1, there is an 
enhanced probability that the actual majority group at time t-1 and the actual majority 
group at time t will be opposite.  This positive correlation can be understood by 
considering, for example, the case in which at time t-1 there is a majority of potential 
buyers.  If the price at time t-1 is not too high, there will be a high probability for a 
majority of actual buyers at time t-1.  This will tend to force the price up at time t, and so 
will decrease the chance that the group of actual buyers will be a majority at time t.  That 
is, it will increase the chance that the actual majority group at time t will be sellers.  In 
this scenario, the group of potential sellers at time t-1 (who form the minority group of 
potentials at t-1 in this example) will be rewarded.  This is exactly the minority dynamics.   
Thus, in the market game, induced minority dynamics predominates when 0<d/λ<2, and 
is particularly pronounced when 1<d/λ<1.5.  At its peak, when d/λ≈1.3, the market game 
is about 78 percent minority dynamics.  This minority dynamics is due both to the 
intrinsic structure of the market game, and to the induced positive correlation between 
P(1) and ρ2. 
 
The presence of induced minority dynamics helps explain the behavior of N/2σ of the 
potential buyers and the price volatility in the high m region.  Consider, for example, 
N=101, λ=100 and two values of d, d=150 and d=190.  When N=101 and d/λ=1.5 
(d/λ=1.9), for all m>6, ρ1 is about 0.8 (0.55) implying that induced minority dynamics 
dominates at about the 80% (55%) level.  In Fig. 7 we compare N/2σ  of potential 
buyers in these market games with that of the simple mixed minority-majority game 
described in section II, with a matched percentage of minority dynamics.  The similarity 
is obvious, even though the minority dynamics in the market game is induced, while the 
minority dynamics in the simple mixed game is inserted ab initio.  Comparisons for price 
volatility between the mixed majority-minority game and the market game are similar.  
 
These arguments are only valid when m is greater than 6. (This number may be slightly N 
dependent, but see eq. (13) for a semi-quantitative derivation of this cross-over value of 
m.)  For m below this value, different dynamics apply.  Fig. 8 shows P(1), ρ1 and ρ2 as 
function of d/λ for m=2.  It can be seen that, when d/λ<2, neither delayed majority 
dynamics nor minority dynamics are dominant since both ρ1 and ρ2 are close to 0.5.  
Behaviors in this parameter range will be discussed in next paragraph.  When d/λ>2, all 
of the three quantities, P(1), ρ1 and ρ2, reach an approximately constant value.  These 
values are also m-dependent.  The value of ρ1 in this region is greater than 0.5, which 
would seem to imply that the game played here is a mixed minority-majority game with 
some fraction of minority dynamics.  However, the dynamics here are very different from 
the simple mixed minority-majority game.  First note that the step-function-like behavior 
at d/λ=2 is caused by the generation of large price fluctuations for d/λ>2, as described 
above for the high m case.  However, when m is small, another dynamic is at play which 
changes the behavior of the system and lead to different values of P(1) and the ρi’s.  We 
will first explain the behavior of the system for low m and  d/λ<2, following which we 
will return to discuss the behavior for low m and d/λ>2.   Some of the results in the 
former will be helpful in our discussion of the latter. 
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We now provide a qualitative description on the behaviors of the games in the low-m 
phase with d/λ<2.  In these games, there is a biased state in which one trading action is 
strongly favored over the other.  In “regular” market games (or states), we expect that the 
long-term average of the commodity price is close to the median of the distribution of 
price expectations of the agents.  If the initial price p(0) is close to this value, then the 
long-term average price will also be about the same as the initial price p(0).  As is usual 
with the laws of supply and demand, if the price significantly deviates from the median of 
expectations say, when it is much higher, then there will be more agents actually selling 
than buying and the excess supply will lower the price dragging it back to “normal”.  
This is the general picture of the price movement in a market game, assuming that on 
average each agent has equal probability to sell or to buy, which means that at a given 
time, the number of potential traders is not biased.   
 
In a “biased state”, this assumption doesn’t hold.  For example, in a buying-biased state, 
most agents are stuck with a strategy that favors buying over selling.  (I.e. potential 
buyers greatly outnumber potential sellers).  In such a state a low to medium price will be 
driven up by a surplus of buyers.  But because potential buyers outnumber potential 
sellers, the equilibrium price to which the commodity is driven, peq, will not be close to 
the median of the agents’ expectations.   When the price is near peq there is nearly equal 
probability for the price to rise or fall, but the potential majority group of seller or buyers 
(in this case, buyers) is always the same, so ρ1 and ρ2 are close to 0.5.  P(1) still increases 
with increasing d/λ, due to the increased negative correlation between D(t) and D(t+1).   
 
This kind of biased states can be easily reached, particularly when m is low.  Recall that 
the fundamental ab initio dynamics in our market game is delayed majority dynamics, so 
there is a natural tendency to reach a steady state that favors one action.  Consider the 
following scenario, which can easily occur, particularly with smaller m: a significant 
majority of agents’ higher-ranking strategies have more 1’s (buy) than 0’s (sell), (This 
situation is easier to realize for small m, because there is less heterogeneity among 
agents’ strategies when m is small.)  For most input signals, this configuration will 
produce a response of buyer-majority.  If, for several consecutive time steps, the 
randomly-generated input signals are such that the responses are all buyer-majority, the 
price will go up, reinforcing the buying bias of most agents, which will lead to further 
price rises.   
 
Such a state is maintained by moderate separations between the ranks of each agent’s two 
strategies.  Since both ρ1 and ρ2 are near 0.5, there is no a priori tendency for the rank 
differences between the strategies to decrease, leading to a reasonable persistence of the 
biased state.  Generally, the biased state will be broken by random fluctuations, after 
which there will be a transient period in which no trading action is preferred.  However, 
in the low-m region the system will soon go back to one or the other biased state 
 
It is possible to derive a relationship between peq and m which can be used to explain the 
value of the cross-over from low-m to high-m dynamics in our game.  The equilibrium 
price is directly related to the fraction of the agents choosing a particular action when in a 
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biased state.  For example, the equilibrium price in a buyer-biased state is given by: 
log(peq)=log(eL)+(log(eU)-log(eL))db, where db is the ratio of (potential buyers)/N.  On 
average, db is given by the formula 
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db is a rapidly decreasing function of m.  When m > 5, db is very close to 0.5, which 
means that the equilibrium price is almost the same as the median of agents’ 
expectations.  Thus, for m>5, it is difficult for the system to enter and maintain a biased 
state. 
 
The effect of the biased states on the price volatility is primarily manifested through the 
switching between the buying-biased-states and selling-biased-states.  During the epoch 
of one biased state, the price volatility is small because of the reduced number of actual 
traders, which explains those data points with small volatility observed in figure 3.  But if 
the time period of interest spans opposite biased states, the volatility will be high.  
Indeed, if we observe the runs shown in Fig. 3 for a longer time, the low volatility results 
for small m will rise.  In addition, since in the low-m regions, lower m leads to larger 
separation of the equilibrium prices of the two opposite (buying and selling)-biased 
states, price volatility (upper branch) increases with decreasing m. 
 
We now return to a brief explanation of the case d/λ>2 and small m.  Recall that in the 
case of d/λ>2 and large m, the price alternates with each time step between very high and 
very low values.  For low m, there is a high probability that an extremely high (low) price 
is accompanied by a state in which most agents belong to the group of potential buyers 
(sellers).  This causes the magnitude of D(t+1) to be small so that the price at  time t+1 
reverts to lie between eL and eU.   This increases the probability that D(t+2) is not of 
opposite sign of D(t+1) thus effectively reducing P(1).  The increase in ρ1 from 0.5 can 
be explained in a similar way. 
 
Although of some passing interest, the case in which d/λ>2 is not of central importance.  
In our model agents’ expectations are fixed from the beginning of the game and so eL and 
eU are fixed parameters.  But in real markets, the expectations of agents can (and do) 
change with their observations of price history.  So, if the price gets very large, agents’ 
expectations will change, and the price will still fluctuate between (newly established 
values of) eL and eU.  The dynamics of wild price fluctuations outside of the range of 
expectations will generally not occur, rendering our model with d/λ>2 unrealistic.    
 
To summarize, in figure 9 we have plotted a qualitative phase diagram for our market 
game, identifying different parameter regions of d/λ and m associated with different 
behaviors.  Of the four phases represented in the figure, one of them gives rise to the 
induced minority dynamics (high m and d/λ<2) and other phases are dominated by other 
(generally less interesting) behaviors. As a function of d/λ, there is a phase change 
exactly at 2.  As a function of m, there is a phase change for m near 5 or 6. 
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VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
 A.  Relationship to Another Market Model 
Before presenting our conclusions, it is worthwhile to briefly compare our approach to 
another model of markets that explicitly considers minority dynamics.  We do this for 
two reasons.  First, because there are quite fundamental differences in the two 
approaches, despite superficial similarities.  Second, the differences emphasize 
interesting questions about what ought to be included ab initio in models of financial 
markets.  The model we have in mind is that discussed by Marsili1, which incorporates 
delayed dynamics and heterogeneous agent beliefs.  Although the explanation in this 
paper is somewhat different, the basic idea is that there are two types of agents, 
fundamentalists and trend-followers.  The former presume that winning trades are those 
that place them in the minority of buyers or sellers at a given time step, while the latter, 
are traders who presume that winning trades are those that place them in the majority of 
buyers or sellers at a given time step.  Changes in portfolio values are not directly 
relevant in determining the efficacy of strategies according to each agent.  Rather, an 
agent’s strategy is most valued if its actions accord with the expectations of that agent. 
Marsili discusses the extent to which the resulting game is a majority or minority game, 
and the extent to which price behavior is consistent with agents’ expectations.   
 
The approach in our work is quite different, in that the heterogeneity of our agents is not 
based on different expectations about the dynamics of the market (cf. fundamentalist or 
trend-followers), but on heterogeneous beliefs about the underlying value of the 
commodity being traded.  Furthermore, the success of an agent’s strategies in our 
approach is evaluated directly on the basis of whether that strategies actions led to an 
increase or decrease in the portfolio value of the agent.  (In this regard, the difference 
between Ref. 1 and our work parallels the difference pointed out earlier in mixed 
majority-minority games between “mixed-populations” and “temporal-mixing”.)  In the 
work of Ref. 1, minority dynamics and majority dynamics is inserted into the model ab 
initio in the form of heterogeneous beliefs by the agents about market dynamics.  In our 
model, minority dynamics emerges from the interaction of agents whose fundamental 
heterogeneity is associated with different beliefs about the commodity’s underlying 
value. 
 
Real financial markets are extraordinarily complex, in no small part due to the 
complexity of the agents (traders).  The work in Ref. 1 highlights and models one source 
of heterogeneity in traders.  Our work highlights and models another.  To what extent 
these sources of heterogeneity are important in different markets at different times is a 
complex question, well beyond the scope of this discussion.  However, the study of a 
range of models that isolate different aspects of heterogeneity is clearly useful in trying to 
isolate and understand the consequences of different kinds of heterogeneous beliefs.15   
 
 B.  Summary and Conclusion 
Very simple arguments suggest that minority dynamics express a fundamental dynamic 
of financial markets in the sense that “buying low” or “selling high” can be understood as 
minority actions in a market driven by a very simple supply-demand relation.  However, 
these arguments are inadequate in that they do not take into account realistic mechanisms 
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by which agents determine value based on predictions of price movements.  In this paper, 
we argued that delayed majority dynamics is a simple version of a realistic and primary 
dynamic in many financial markets.   We then showed that a simple delayed majority 
game is trivial and has uninteresting behaviors.  However, when a game with delayed 
majority dynamics is modified to include heterogeneous price expectations for the agents 
(which allows agents to choose not to trade if their price expectations and preferences for 
action are inconsistent), the emergent behavior is much more interesting.  In particular, 
we find that for a reasonable range of parameter settings, (see below) this game (the 
Market Game) exhibits emergent dynamics consistent with that seen in the Minority 
Game, despite the fact that minority dynamics are not introduced ab initio.  We 
furthermore showed that the introduction of heterogeneous price expectations has the 
happy consequence of lowering price volatility.  The important controlling variable in the 
Market Game is the ratio between the density of expectations, d, and the liquidity, λ.  
When 0<d/λ<2 and m>6, minority dynamics are induced and the market game exhibits 
minority game behavior.  Finally, we discussed the general phase structure of the Market 
Game as a function of the control parameters, d/λ and m.  For other values of these 
parameters qualitatively different (and in general less interesting) behaviors were 
observed for which we provided qualitative explanations. 
 
It is most gratifying that minority dynamics emerges in the Market Game.  This result 
justifies our most basic intuition about the role of supply and demand in determining 
value, and shows how the primacy of minority behavior (“buy-low, sell-high”) emerges 
from a model that embodies more realistic fundamental dynamics.     
 
We are very grateful to Michael Wellman for many helpful suggestions and stimulating 
discussions on this topic. 
 Figure Captions 
1. σ2/N vs. Z for minority game with N=101, 16 runs for each parameter setting 
2. σ2/N vs. Z for mixed minority-majority game. N=101. Each line represents set of 
games with certain p. From bottom to top, p ranges from 0% to 100%, in 10% 
increments 
3. Market volatility of market game with N=101. Volatilities are calculated on the 
last 2,000 time steps of simulations of 10,000 time steps. 
4. σ2/N of the number of “potential buyers” in the market game in figure 3. 
5. P(1) as a function of d/λ for market games with different d and λ settings. 
6. ρ1 and ρ2 as a function of d/λ for market games with different d and λ settings, 
m=8. 
7. σ2/N of the potential buyers of market game and the σ2/N of the mixed 
minority/majority game with the same proportion of the minority dynamics. 
8. ρ1, ρ2 and P(1) as function of d/λ for market games with different d and λ 
settings, m=2. 
9. Qualitative phase diagram of the market game. 
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